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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, Congress enacted one the century’s most significant
pieces of civil rights legislation. The Americans with Disabilities Act
1
(“ADA”) ambitiously seeks equal opportunity and full participation
2
in society for disabled individuals. Title I of the ADA focuses
specifically on equal opportunity and full participation in the
† 2003 J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law; 1998 B.A. magna
cum laude, Gustavus Adolphus College.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000).
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workplace. To achieve its laudable goals, the ADA, among other
things, places an affirmative obligation on employers to make
reasonable accommodations for individuals with known
4
disabilities. Reasonable accommodation includes reassignment to
a vacant position, job restructuring, modified work schedules, and
5
other similar accommodations.
The ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision is a powerful
6
and unique tool for disabled individuals. It not only requires
employers to treat disabled and non-disabled employees alike, but
also requires the employer to make individualized changes to its
7
Unfortunately, over time, the reasonable
workplace.
accommodation provision has lost its effectiveness through judicial
8
decisions.
This note specifically discusses how courts have
undermined the ADA by allowing seniority systems to trump
reasonable accommodation.
While seniority systems play a significant role in the American
9
workplace, their purpose clashes with anti-discrimination
10
legislation, such as the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
11
1964 (“Title VII”). Seniority systems seek to retain employees
long-term by giving employees increasing job security and
preferential employment treatment directly proportional to
12
seniority accrued. Such a system maintains the historical status
quo of relegating and excluding minorities and disabled
individuals from the workplace. Conversely, anti-discrimination
legislation seeks to redress historical discrimination of minorities
and disabled individuals by eliminating physical barriers and
13
biases. Realizing this dissonance, Congress decided to limit the
deference afforded to seniority systems and collective bargaining

3. Title I aims to “remove barriers which prevent qualified individuals with
disabilities from enjoying the same employment opportunities that are available to
persons without disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at 350 (2000).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
5. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2) (2001).
6. See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why
Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603, 608-09 (2001).
7. See id.
8. See discussion infra Part II.C.
9. See discussion infra Part II.A.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e – 2000e-17(2000).
11. See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.C.3.
12. See discussion infra Part II.A.
13. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a), 2000e-4(h)(2) (2000).
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14

agreements under the ADA.
The majority of courts, however, have routinely ignored
Congress’s intent when interpreting the conflict between the ADA’s
15
reasonable accommodation provision and seniority systems.
Instead, they have imprudently based their decisions on the
historical significance of non-legally binding seniority systems in
the American workplace, as well as legal precedent from other anti16
discrimination legislations – notably Title VII.
While Title VII shares in the revolutionary spirit of the ADA, its
purpose of eliminating discrimination targets a different class of
17
individuals and utilizes means designed for that particular class.
Title VII also does not mandate “reasonable accommodation,” and
more importantly, it expressly exempts employment actions made
18
pursuant to bona fide seniority systems. Congress rejected such
an exemption in the ADA and stated that a seniority system is only
19
a factor in the “reasonable accommodation” analysis. The courts’
failure to appreciate these differences between Title VII and the
ADA thwarts Congress’s goal of eliminating workplace
discrimination against disabled individuals.
Moreover, it
exacerbates the burgeoning challenges disabled individuals face
when they enter a courtroom.
For several years now, the circuit courts have divided on the
issue of whether a seniority system trumps the reasonable
20
accommodation provision of the ADA. After the Ninth Circuit
rejected this notion, the Supreme Court reviewed the issue in U.S.
21
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett. As part of its trilogy of pro-employer ADA
22
cases decided that same term, the Barnett Court created a
14. See discussion infra Part IV.C; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63
(1990).
15. See discussion infra Part II.C; see also infra note 96.
16. See discussion infra Parts II.C.1, IV.A.
17. See discussion infra Part II.B.
18. See discussion infra Part II.B; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000).
19. See discussion infra Part II.C.
20. See discussion infra Part II.C.
21. 535 U.S. 391, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002); see discussion infra Part III.C. At the
time that this article was published U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett had not been
published in the United States Reports, therefore the article will use the Supreme
Court Reporter when citing Barnett.
22. Chevron v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2046 (2002) (holding
that employers can consider direct threats to an employee’s own health and safety
in determining whether to remove the employee); Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002) (making it more difficult for employees to
prove they are disabled).
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confusing and burdensome rule for disabled employees. The
Court created a presumption that the mere presence of a seniority
system was ordinarily sufficient to show that an accommodation is
24
not reasonable. This presumption can only be overcome if the
plaintiff can show special circumstances—normally within the
ambit of the employer’s knowledge—that warrant a finding that the
requested accommodation is nonetheless reasonable on the
25
particular facts. Consequently, employers can hide behind
unilaterally imposed seniority systems when making employment
decisions involving accommodation requests by disabled
employees.
This note examines the history of seniority systems and anti26
discrimination legislation in the United States. Specifically, this
note addresses Title VII and the ADA; both of which seek to redress
historical discrimination in the workplace, but approach seniority
27
systems differently. The third section details the judicial history of
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, beginning with the Ninth Circuit’s
28
analysis through the Supreme Court’s divided opinions. Part VI
analyzes and criticizes the majority’s problematic approach and
analyzes the remaining opinions and their merits. This note
concludes that the Court’s ruling rests on a shaky foundation based
on custom and unpersuasive legal precedent, and ignores the plain
29
language and legislative intent of the ADA.
II. HISTORY OF SENIORITY SYSTEMS AND
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION IN THE U.S.
A. Seniority Systems’ Customary Role
In times of economic downturn, job security becomes a
30
priority, ahead of wages. In the American workforce, job security
is often based on seniority—the length of time the employee has

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1505; see discussion infra Part IV.
Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1525.
Id.
See infra Part II.
See infra Parts II.B-C.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part V.
See M ARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND
M ATERIALS 658 (4th ed. 1998).
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worked for an employer. There are two main types of seniority:
32
benefits seniority and competitive seniority. The former grants
employees increasing eligibility for benefits based on length of
service and involves relations between the employee and
33
employer. The latter describes priority systems for allocation of
scarce employment conditions and involves relationships among
34
employees. Competitive seniority is more contentious, as it is
most often implicated in bidding systems for job transfers and last35
hired, first-fired layoff actions.
Although there are no legal requirements for seniority
36
systems, they have become a deeply ingrained concept in the
37
American employment system.
This custom has important
consequences for employees and employers. For employees, their
38
job security is directly proportional to seniority accrued. In
addition to giving employees a measure of expected job security,
39
seniority plays a dominant role in making employment decisions.
Employees with greater seniority gain preferential treatment with
respect to certain employment decisions, including promotions,
40
wages, and work-shifts. Employers who utilize seniority systems
41
promote an environment of teamwork and training. Because
skills are often acquired on the job, employers need senior
42
employees to train new recruits. However, without a seniority
system employees realize that every new employee could result in a
31. Id. at 659.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. In fact, seniority is often exempted from legislation providing leave of
absence provisions. See id. at 660 (“The Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment
Assistance Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026 (2000), provides that persons who, as a
consequence of being inducted into the United States military, must leave
permanent positions of employment, have a right to be reinstated to their former
positions, or to positions of like seniority, status, and pay, upon their return.”).
However, veterans are not entitled to accrue seniority. See Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(A) (2000) (“Nothing in this section
shall be construed to entitle any restored employee to . . . the accrual of any
seniority . . . benefits during any period of leave.”).
37. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 30, at 660.
38. Berta E. Hernandez, Title VII v. Seniority: The Supreme Court Giveth and the
Supreme Court Taketh Away, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 339, 342 (1986).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 30, at 660.
42. Id.
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greater probability of being fired in times of economic downturn.
This may cause a senior employee to seek a monopoly of
44
knowledge and refuse to share this knowledge. A seniority system
promotes training and teamwork by assuring the senior employee
45
that the new recruit will be fired first in the event of a layoff.
Theoretically, seniority affects employees regardless of race,
46
gender, religion, national origin, or disability. However, in reality,
seniority has deleterious effects on the employment opportunities
47
and expectations of minority groups. Historically, employers used
seniority rules to exclude minorities from higher paying and
respectable jobs, relegating them to less desirable and lower paying
48
jobs. Because non-minorities have not been the targets of past
discriminatory practices, they often have more seniority than
minorities. Consequently, the application of seniority rules to jobs
formerly restricted to non-minorities seriously undercuts the job
49
security of newly admitted minority workers.
This disparity between minorities and non-minorities is further
exacerbated by legislative and judicial exemptions of seniority
systems from important legislation aimed at eradicating the
discriminatory effects of employment decisions based on race,
50
51
52
color, religion, gender, national origin, age, and disability.
Consequently, and ironically, it may be lawful for employers to
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Hernandez, supra note 38, at 342.
47. Id. at 342-43.
48. Id. at 343 n.22.
49. Id. at n.17.
50. Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating in employment
decisions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2 (2000). However, section 703(h) permits employers to use different
standards of compensation and terms and conditions of employment decisions
pursuant to a bona fide seniority system. Id. at § 2000e-2(h).
51. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) makes it unlawful
for an employer to fail or refuse to hire, to discharge any individual, or to
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of an individual’s age. 29 U.S.C.
§ 621-634 (2000). However, section 623(f) states that it is not unlawful for an
employer to discriminate on the basis of age in order to observe the terms of a
bona fide seniority system that is not intended to evade the purposes of the ADEA.
Id. at § 623(f).
52. The Supreme Court ruled, in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516,
1525 (2002), that seniority systems will generally trump the Americans with
Disabilities Act’s reasonable accommodation provision.
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discriminate if the decision is made pursuant to or in observance of
the terms of a seniority system.
B. Title VII and Seniority
Title VII ranks among the century’s most notable pieces of
anti-discrimination legislation. The Act makes it unlawful for
employers to discriminate in hiring, firing, compensation, and
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of race,
53
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
The Act proscribes
intentional discrimination, as well as practices that are facially
54
neutral but adversely affect the Act’s protected classes.
Some congressional leaders feared that the Act’s broad sweep
would give preferential treatment to newly hired minorities over
55
more senior whites. Consequently, section 703(h) was added
permitting employers to use different standards of compensation,
terms, privileges, and conditions of employment pursuant to a
56
bona fide seniority system. Section 703(h) reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system . . .
provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate
because of race, color, religion,
57
sex, or national origin.
In interpreting section 703(h), the courts have consistently
increased its protection of seniority systems by expanding its reach
to unlawful seniority systems adopted before and after the passage of
58
the Act.
Courts achieved this by limiting the definition of
unlawful seniority systems to only those that are implemented with
an intent to discriminate, rather than those that have a disparate
59
impact.

53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, e-16 (2000).
54. Hernandez, supra note 38, at 344.
55. Id. at 345 (citing George Cooper & Richard B. Sobol, Seniority and Testing
Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and
Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1613 (1969)).
56. Id.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000).
58. See discussion infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
59. Id.
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1. Title VII’s Limited Protection of Seniority Systems
Initially, courts interpreted Title VII broadly, by limiting
section 703(h)’s protection of seniority systems and expanding
Title VII’s scope to intentional and facially neutral practices of
discrimination.
The courts first delineated two types of
discrimination under Title VII: disparate treatment and disparate
60
impact. The former refers to intentional discrimination and the
61
latter refers to facially neutral policies
that have a
62
disproportionate effect on minorities.
Next, the courts
distinguished discriminatory acts and practices occurring before
the passage of Title VII from those occurring after the Act’s
passage.
Just a few years after Title VII’s enactment, a circuit court and
district court found that section 703(h)’s protection of seniority
systems did not extend to pre-Act seniority systems that intentionally
63
perpetuated the effects of past discrimination. However, it was
60. There are two different types of discrimination proscribed by Title VII:
disparate treatment and disparate impact.
Disparate treatment . . . is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably
than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical . . . .Claims of
disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress
“disparate impact.” The latter involve employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified
by business necessity . . . . Proof of discriminatory motive . . . is not
required under a disparate impact theory.
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
61. In a landmark case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the
Supreme Court invalidated facially neutral practices that had a disproportionate and
deleterious effect on Title VII’s protected classes. Id. at 431 (holding that Title VII
requires “the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of a
racial or other impermissible classification.”). The Court found that facially
neutral policies that perpetuated discrimination violated the spirit of Title VII. Id.
(“The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If
an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to
be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”). Accordingly, an
employer’s facially neutral policy and lack of bad faith could not overcome a
showing that its policies disfavored a protected group. See id. at 432. Griggs,
however, did not address seniority systems. See id.
62. See supra note 61.
63. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d
980 (5th Cir. 1969); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss4/3

8

Pirius: "Seniority Rules"?: Disabled Employees' Rights under the ADA Give
PIRIUS_F ORMATTED_1

2003]

3/27/2003 11:58 PM

U.S. AIRWAYS, INC. V. BARNETT

1489

not until 1976 that the Supreme Court addressed seniority systems
in conflict with Title VII. In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,
the Court permitted retroactive seniority to victims of
64
discrimination. This allowed victims to obtain their deserved
65
status in the hierarchy of an employer’s seniority system. The
Court found that even though the practice of retroactive seniority
relief may adversely impact incumbent employees, the relief could
66
be granted if it furthered the objectives of Title VII. As a result,
victims of discrimination were permitted to obtain their “rightful
67
place.”
These first few decisions sought to balance the rights of
minorities and non-minorities. In an effort to follow the
revolutionary spirit of Title VII, the courts prohibited employers
from filling future vacancies on the basis of unlawful seniority
systems and supported corrective action that would end the “status
68
quo.” However, the courts rejected the bumping of non-minority
incumbent workers, thus forcing victims of discrimination to
69
remain in their inferior positions until vacancies occurred.
2. Title VII’s Increasing Protection of Seniority Systems
In 1977, the Supreme Court began to expand the protections
of section 703(h). In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
70
States, the Court found that a seniority system that perpetuated
the effects of pre-Act discrimination was lawful, because section
71
703(h) provided an exemption for bona fide seniority systems. As a
result, a plaintiff must establish actual intent to discriminate in
72
order to show that a seniority system violates Title VII. It was no
longer enough to show discrimination by demonstrating that a
73
facially neutral policy had a disparate impact on protected classes.
1968).
64. 424 U.S. 747, 767-68 (1976).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 774-75.
67. Id. at 768. In addition, the Court noted that section 703(h) defined
unlawful employment practices, but did not limit the relief that could be awarded
when an unlawful practice was found. Id. at 758.
68. See Hernandez, supra note 38, at 349.
69. See id.
70. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
71. Id. at 352-53.
72. Id. at 353.
73. Id. However, the Court did not expressly overrule Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971), because Griggs did not involve a section 703(h) analysis of
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This standard was an abrupt change from the Court’s prior
goal of equality by helping minorities attain their “rightful place” in
employment. The Supreme Court concluded that Title VII never
intended to invalidate facially neutral seniority policies, nor
eliminate non-minority employees’ vested seniority rights under
such a policy, even if this exercise perpetuated the effects of prior
74
discrimination. Instead, the Teamsters decision placed a hardship
on Title VII plaintiffs and “created an unpalatable situation,
75
permanently handicapping victims of discrimination.”
Following the Teamsters decision, the Court continued on its
course of protecting seniority systems that Title VII sought to
76
invalidate. In Pullman-Standard v. Swint, the Court reiterated its
77
decision in Teamsters by eliminating disparate impact analyses in
78
seniority system challenges under Title VII. Most disconcerting,
though, was the Court’s decision in American Tobacco Co. v.
79
80
Patterson. Undermining a prior decision, the Court ruled that
section 703(h) also protected bona fide seniority systems created
after the passage of the Act, and held that both pre- and post-Act
seniority systems can only be invalidated by proof of an intent to
81
discriminate. Four justices, in two dissenting opinions, argued
82
that the majority opinion was inconsistent with Title VII. The four
dissenting justices stated that: (1) Congress did not intend to
83
protect “new rights that are the by-product of discrimination;” (2)
disparate impact analysis should still apply to post-Act seniority
84
systems; and (3) a seniority system is not bona fide if unlawful when
85
adopted. Despite criticism, the Court has yet to change its course.
Cases decided subsequent to Patterson continue to advance the
86
Court’s expansion of section 703(h).
bona fide seniority systems. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 349.
74. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 353-54.
75. Hernandez, supra note 38, at 353.
76. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
77. Id. at 276-77.
78. Id. at 289.
79. 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
80. See Hernandez, supra note 38, at 357 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
81. Patterson, 456 U.S. at 69-71.
82. Id. at 77-90.
83. Id. at 78 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
84. Id. at 89-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 87-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. See Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 908-09 (1989) (reiterating
that a claim under section 703(h) depends on proof of intentional discrimination,
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3. Effect of the Supreme Court’s Rulings on
Title VII and Seniority
The Court’s decisions giving broad protection to seniority
systems stifle the purpose of Title VII. By allowing facially neutral
policies enacted before and after the Act to find protection under
section 703(h), the Court is maintaining the status quo of prior
discrimination, rather than remedying the historic exclusion of
87
minorities from equal participation in the workplace.
Consequently, even if a minority finds a job, a facially neutral
seniority system will result in a layoff of mostly minorities based on
the “last-hired, first-fired” approach. Is this what Congress
intended by enacting one of the most important and revolutionary
civil rights legislations of the 20th century?
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act and Seniority
88

The ADA was modeled, in part, on Title VII. Enacted in
1990, the ADA ambitiously sought to address the “pervasive social
problem” of over forty-three million disabled Americans who were
excluded from full participation in society because of their
89
disabilities. In the employment arena, Congress’s goal was to
increase the employment of qualified disabled individuals by not
90
only prohibiting employers from discriminating, but also by
affirmatively requiring employers to provide reasonable
91
accommodation. Theoretically, the ADA operates as a powerful
showing disparate impact is not enough); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 578-80 (1984) (giving preference to seniority agreements over
affirmative action consent decrees).
87. See Hernandez, supra note 38, at 382.
88. “It is evident from the legislative history that several provisions of Title VII
were copied or incorporated by reference into the ADA.” U.S. Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1533 (2002) (citing S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 2, 25, 43
(1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 54, 76-77 (1990), Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (101 Stat.) 303,
358-60 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 –12117 (2000)).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2000).
90. “No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
91. Defining “discrimination” as “not making reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with
a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
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mechanism against disability discrimination.
In reality, its
provisions are inconsistently applied and the plaintiffs’ claims are
92
often defeated.
The ADA obligates employers to provide reasonable
accommodations to disabled workers as a means of enabling those
93
workers to perform essential job duties.
Perhaps the most
controversial accommodation is “reassignment to a vacant
position.” While it aids disabled employees in procuring gainful
employment, this accommodation imposes significant burdens on
employers and other employees. As a consequence, courts have
been reluctant to implement the ADA’s provisions as Congress
94
initially envisioned them. This is especially true in the context of
reassignment of a disabled employee to a vacant position when the
95
employer has a seniority system in place. The failure of Congress
to provide express language in the ADA indicating whether the
rights of a disabled employee supersede those of employees with
seniority rights has led to confusion and inconsistency in the

operation of the business of such covered entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)
(2000).
92. According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), between July 26, 1992 and Sept. 30, 2001, only 32.6 percent of the
claims brought by the EEOC on behalf of plaintiffs were successful. These
numbers only reflects claims that are brought by the EEOC; they do not reflect
suits brought by individuals. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
Charges FY 1992 - FY 2001, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html (last
visited Oct. 4, 2002). See also Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination
Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001) (discussing plaintiffs’ success rates
in employment discrimination cases, including Title VII, Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, and the ADA).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000). The ADA states that a reasonable
accommodation may include:
(1) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (2) job restructuring;
part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters,
and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
Id.
94. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
95. See Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation
Issues: Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439 (2002); Estella
J. Schoen, Does the ADA Make Exceptions in a Unionized Workplace? The Conflict Between
the Reassignment Provision of the ADA and Collectively Bargained Seniority Systems, 82
M INN. L. REV. 1391 (1998).
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96

courts.

1. The Majority Approach
Only a year after the ADA’s enactment, the Seventh Circuit
97
took the opportunity to address this question in Eckles v.
98
Consolidated Rail Corp. Eckles worked as a yardmaster – a position
that required varying shifts in a tower office accessible only by
99
stairs. During his employment, a doctor diagnosed Eckles with
epilepsy and advised him to transfer to a shift with regular hours
100
and to cease working in the tower office.
Pursuant to the
employer’s collective bargaining agreement, Eckles requested that
the employer bump another employee in order to accommodate
101
his disability. The employer initially granted Eckles’ request, but
102
later reneged the accommodation.
The Seventh Circuit framed the issue as a conflict between the
rights of the disabled employee and his co-workers, rather than
103
between the employer and employee. In this context, the court
found that Congress did not intend to “bump” other employees out
104
of their positions to accommodate disabled employees.
According to the court’s interpretation of “reassignment to a
vacant position,” open positions will rarely be “vacant” when a
seniority system exists, because more senior employees should be
105
allowed to fill those positions.
Moreover, the court looked at cases decided under the
96. Several circuits have adopted a per-se rule that an employer is not
required to violate a seniority system in order to reassign a disabled employee. See
Lujan v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 165 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 1999); Foreman v Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 1997); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76 (3d Cir.
1997); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996); Milton v.
Scrivner, 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d
1108 (8th Cir. 1995). Other courts have rejected the per se approach for a
balancing approach. See Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 1999); Aka v.
Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1997), vacated, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (en banc); Ransom v. Arizona, 983 F. Supp. 895 (D. Ariz. 1997); Emrick v.
Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
97. See cases cited supra note 96 and accompanying text.
98. 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996).
99. Id. at 1043.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1044.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1046.
104. Id. at 1049-50.
105. Id. at 1045-46.
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Rehabilitation Act and Title VII to reinforce its reasoning. The
Seventh Circuit found that, under the Rehabilitation Act, courts
unanimously held that employers are not required to reassign a
108
disabled employee in violation of a bona fide seniority system.
With respect to Title VII, the Seventh Circuit reviewed Trans World
109
Airlines v. Hardison, a case involving a conflict between a demand
for religious reasonable accommodation and the seniority rights of
110
other employees under a collective bargaining agreement. The
Seventh Circuit found persuasive the Supreme Court’s decision to
reject the accommodation in light of the collective bargaining
111
agreement provision. Consequently, the court held that the ADA
did not require the employer to violate the bona fide seniority
rights of other workers under the collective bargaining agreement
and upheld the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the
112
employer.
2. The Minority Approach
113

The minority challenges the view that a seniority system is a
per se bar to reassignment. It instead takes on several balancing
114
approaches, two of which can be found in Aka v. Washington
115
Hospital Center. A panel of the D.C. Circuit first heard the case in

106. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000).
107. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1047-48.
108. Id. at 1047-48. Even though the Rehabilitation Act does not require
reassignment in any instance, the court felt that Rehabilitation Act cases were
appropriate in determining the meaning of reasonable accommodation in this
ADA case. Id. at 1048-49; see also 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(4) (2000).
109. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
110. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1048.
111. Id. at 1048-49. Yet, noting that “the Senate and House Reports on the
ADA clarified Hardison’s statement that only de minimus costs were required for
reasonable accommodation does not apply under the ADA.” Id. at 1049 (citations
omitted).
112. Id. at 1051-52. “[W]e conclude that the ADA does not require disabled
individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide
seniority rights of other employees.” Id. at 1051 (emphasis added).
113. See cases cited supra note 96 and accompanying text.
114. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 122 S.
Ct. 1516 (2002) (holding that a seniority system is not a per se bar to reassignment,
but rather is a factor in the undue hardship analysis); Emrick v. Libbey-OwensFord Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 396-98 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that a collective
bargaining agreement should be a factor to consider when determining the
reasonableness of the accommodation).
115. 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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116

1997. Subsequently, the case was reheard en banc and decided
117
on other grounds. The D.C. Circuit’s analysis demonstrates the
different balancing approaches taken by the minority view.
Aka had worked as an orderly for twenty years, when he
118
developed heart disease and underwent bypass surgery.
His
position as an orderly was physically strenuous, and after surgery,
his doctor advised him that he could no longer work as an
119
Aka advised his employer of his disability and applied
orderly.
120
for several vacant, less strenuous positions.
However, Aka’s
employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement,
and the hospital refused to hire Aka for any of the vacant positions
on the basis that such a reassignment would violate the agreement’s
121
terms.
The district court rejected Aka’s claim and granted
122
summary judgment for the employer. In the first decision, the
D.C. Circuit reversed and concluded that the legislative history
supported a fact-specific, reasonable accommodation analysis and
123
that seniority provisions should be a factor in that analysis.
The Aka court considered many of the same factors as the
Eckles court. First, the Aka court determined that the ADA’s plain
language required reassignment subject only to specific
124
125
exceptions.
Next, the court looked at a House Report that
stated:
The collective bargaining agreement could be relevant . . .
in determining whether a given accommodation is
reasonable. For example, if a collective bargaining
agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with a
given amount of seniority, it may be considered as a factor
in determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation
to assign an employee with a disability without seniority to
the job. However,
the agreement would not be determinative
126
on the issue.

116. Id.
117. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
118. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 892.
122. Id. at 877.
123. Id. at 895-96.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 895.
126. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267, 345-46 (emphasis added).
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The court found that this language bolstered its conclusion
that Congress intended to prohibit a per se rule based on seniority
127
provisions. Finally, unlike the Eckles court, the Aka court found
that cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII were
128
irrelevant to its analysis. Because the Rehabilitation Act does not
mention reassignment, the additional language in the ADA
explicitly addressing reassignment rendered the Rehabilitation Act
129
cases unpersuasive. Likewise, the court stated that “the nature of
the ADA prevents the Supreme Court’s Title VII decision in Trans
World Airlines v. Hardison from being directly applicable to this
130
case.”
The court subsequently vacated the Aka decision and decided
131
it on different grounds en banc.
The court en banc based its
decision on the provisions of the union’s collective bargaining
132
agreement, rather than the ADA. However, the court did address
provisions of the ADA. Specifically, the court found that
reassignment does not merely mean allowing one to compete
133
equally for a job.
To begin with the statutory text, the word “reassign” must
mean more than allowing an employee to apply for a job
on the same basis as anyone else. An employee who on
his own initiative applies for and obtains a job elsewhere
in the enterprise would not be described as having been
“reassigned”; the core word “assign” implies some active
effort on the part of the employer. Indeed the ADA’s
reference to reassignment would be redundant if
permission to apply were all it meant; the ADA already
prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual

127. Aka, 116 F.3d at 895.
128. Id. at 893. “With regard to the cases construing the Rehabilitation Act, we
note that although this Act is quite similar to the ADA in most respects, the two
acts diverge sharply on this particular question, because the ADA explicitly
suggests ‘reassignment to a vacant position’ as a form of ‘reasonable
accommodation’ that may be required of employers.” Id. (citations omitted).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 896 n.14 (citations omitted).
131. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
132. Id. at 1302-03. “On the present record, we cannot (and need not) reach
the further question of whether in every case in which the ADA would require
WHC to reassign an employee, section 14.5 would permit WHC to do so.” Id. at
1303.
133. Id. at 1304.
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134

in regard to job application procedures.
The D.C. Circuit noted numerous courts have found that the
reassignment obligation means something more than treating a
135
disabled employee like any other job applicant. Subsequently, in
136
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., the Tenth Circuit agreed with the Aka
court by holding that “[t]he disabled employee has a right in fact
to the reassignment, and not just to the consideration process
137
leading up to the potential reassignment.”
3. Legislative Goals vs. Judicial Interpretations
In enacting the ADA, Congress set forth its goal of
empowering disabled individuals by eliminating obstacles in the
138
workplace. Title I of the ADA is specifically designed to remove
barriers to employment for disabled persons regardless of whether
the barriers result from intentional discrimination or from
structures, policies, or procedures that have an unintended
139
discriminatory effect on the disabled. By allowing discriminatory
seniority systems to trump the rights of the disabled, the courts
have effectively eradicated the Act’s purpose and power.
134. Id. (citations omitted).
135. Id. (citing Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 418 (3d Cir. 1997); Gile v.
United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 496-99 (7th Cir. 1996); Benson v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (8th Cir. 1995)).
136. 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
137. Id. at 1166. This reasoning has been criticized by several courts as giving
preferential treatment to disabled employees. See E.E.O.C. v. Humiston-Keeling,
Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1027-29 (7th Cir. 2000) (criticizing preferential treatment
given to disabled employees in reassignment as giving “bonus points” and
constituting “affirmative action with a vengeance”); Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto.,
Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 679 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that the “rule would convert a
nondiscrimination statute into a mandatory preference statute”); Daughtery v. City
of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating “we do not read the ADA as
requiring affirmative action in favor of individuals with disabilities in the sense of
requiring that disabled persons be given priority in hiring or reassignment over
persons who are not disabled”).
138. Senator Harkin stated that the ADA was “nothing less than an
‘[E]mancipation [P]roclamation’ for people with disabilities who will finally
benefit from civil rights protections in the areas of private sector employment.”
136 CONG. REC. S9684, S9691 (1990) (statement of Sen. Inouye); “The time has
come to firmly establish the right of these Americans to dignity and self-respect as
equal and contributing members of society and to end the virtual isolation of
millions of children and adults from society.” Id. (Sen. Simon quoting Sen.
Humphrey); “Mr. President, this ‘declaration of independence’ for the citizens
with disabilities of this Nation has been a long time coming.” Id. at S9690-91
(statement of Sen. Simon).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
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Even though the ADA and Title VII have a similar goal,
Congress recognized discrimination against disabled individuals
140
and minorities is distinct in cause. A person’s race, sex, religion,
and national origin are usually unrelated to the person’s ability to
141
perform job duties.
A disability, on the other hand, may be a
142
legitimate concern in an employment decision.
Accordingly,
Congress defined discrimination in the ADA differently than in
143
Title VII.
Despite the obvious and considerable differences, courts still
144
use Title VII precedent when evaluating the ADA cases. These
differences can be seen in several instances, including the
definition and application of “reasonable accommodation,” the
adoption of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, and the
145
protection of seniority systems.
First, Title VII’s “reasonable
accommodation” is much narrower and more limited than the
146
affirmative and broad definition in the ADA.
Second, the
McDonnell Douglas test is aimed at proving intentional
discrimination and is inappropriate in the majority of ADA cases

140. See Malloy, supra note 6, at 621. “The Congress finds that—unlike
individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex,
national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination
on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such
discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (2000).
141. Malloy, supra note 6, at 621.
142. Id.
143. Under Title VII, “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). The ADA
states that the term discriminate includes “not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee.” 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). See also Malloy, supra note 6, at 622.
The “reasonable accommodation” provision of the ADA is a powerful force. It
compels employers to acknowledge the subtle ways in which the workplace is
biased. Id. at 623. It helps employers realize that workplaces are not structured
neutrally, and it affirmatively obligates employers to make changes to the
workplace. Id. at 624. An employer who fails to reasonably accommodate disabled
employees can be found liable for discrimination. Id. at 625. Conversely, Title VII
does not require the employer to make changes to the workplace, but rather only
requires that employers not treat employees differently. Id. at 625.
144. See Malloy, supra note 6, at 626-27. See also Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94
F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996).
145. See Malloy, supra note 6, at 626-27.
146. See id. at 627-30.
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147

where discrimination is not intentional. Finally, unlike Title VII,
the ADA does not have an exemption for bona fide seniority
systems. However, the courts have used Title VII as a model in
protecting seniority systems, ignoring the ADA’s goals and
legislative history and cutting off the rights of disabled employees
148
working under seniority systems.
The recent Supreme Court
149
decision, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, did just that.
III. THE BARNETT DECISION
A. Facts
In 1990, Robert Barnett injured his back while working in a
150
cargo position at U.S. Airways. Upon returning from disability
leave, Barnett realized he could not perform the physical
151
requirements of the position.
He used his seniority rights to
152
transfer to the mailroom. In August 1992, Barnett learned his
position became open to seniority-based employees bidding under
153
U.S. Airways’ seniority system. In fact, two employees with greater
seniority planned to exercise their seniority rights to transfer to the
154
mailroom.
If Barnett were displaced from the mailroom, he would have
155
been limited to transferring to jobs in the cargo area.
Consequently, Barnett wrote to his station manager requesting that
he be allowed to remain in the mailroom as a reasonable
156
accommodation under the ADA. U.S. Airways did not respond
for five months but allowed Barnett to stay in the mailroom while
157
the company evaluated his claim. In January 1993, U.S. Airways
147. See id. at 643-44. An employer’s building that requires climbing stairs to
gain entrance was most likely not built with the intent to discriminate against the
physically disabled. Id. at 610.
148. See discussion supra Part II.C.
149. 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
150. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1108-09.
155. Id. at 1109.
In 1992, Barnett’s doctor and chiropractor both
recommended that Barnett avoid jobs that require heavy lifting, prolonged
standing or sitting, and excessive bending, twisting, turning, pushing, and pulling.
Id. at 1108.
156. Id. at 1109.
157. Id.
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informed Barnett that it was denying his accommodation request
158
and would place Barnett on job injury leave.
Subsequently,
Barnett sent his manager a second letter proposing that either U.S.
Airways provide him with special lifting equipment in the cargo
area or restructure his cargo position so that he would only do
159
office work. On March 4, 1993, Barnett received a letter denying
160
his alternative requests.
Barnett filed formal charges of discrimination against U.S.
161
Airways in February of 1993. In August 1994, the EEOC issued a
formal determination finding probable cause that U.S. Airways
162
discriminated against Barnett.
However, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of U.S. Airways on all of
163
Barnett’s claims.
Barnett appealed and argued that “U.S. Air
violated the ADA by failing to engage in the interactive process, by
failing to reassign him to the mailroom, by failing to provide other
164
reasonable accommodation, and by retaliating against him.”
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit made three
significant holdings, all of which have received considerable
165
review. First, the court of appeals decided that U.S. Airways failed
to engage in the interactive process and would be liable if a
166
reasonable accommodation without undue hardship was possible.
Thus, the court found a triable issue of fact existed which
167
precluded summary judgment.
Next, the court of appeals
affirmed the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. In the same March 4, 1993 letter, U.S. Airways’ Vice President of
Human Resources informed Barnett that he could bid for any job within his
restrictions. Id. The court of appeals noted there was no evidence that Barnett
was qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, for any other position
within U.S. Airways’ system. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Melissa M. Chureau, The Barnett Paradox: Icarus’s Wings, 6 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 395 (2002); Robert B. White, Reasonable Accommodation Under the
ADA; Equal Opportunity or Preferential Treatment, 44 SEPT. ADVOC. (IDAHO) 24 (2001).
166. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1117. The court also found that Barnett’s request to
remain in the mailroom was a reasonable accommodation absent proof of undue
hardship. Id. at 1122. In addition, the court noted alternative accommodations in
the cargo facility may have been reasonable accommodations absent proof of
undue hardship. Id.
167. Id.
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Barnett’s retaliation claim. Finally, and most controversially, the
court of appeals held “reassignment [to the mailroom] is a
reasonable accommodation and that a seniority system is not a per
se bar to reassignment. However a seniority system is a factor in the
169
undue hardship analysis.”
Consequently, the court’s ruling
requires a case-by-case, fact-intensive analysis of whether any
170
particular assignment would constitute an undue hardship. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review this final
171
ruling and overturned the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis of Seniority Systems Under the ADA
In making its final ruling, the court of appeals divided its
172
analysis into two key questions: (1) whether a seniority system is a
per se bar to reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, and (2)
whether a disabled employee seeking reasonable accommodation
173
should have priority in reassignment.
The court began its
analysis by noting the ADA explicitly states that reasonable
168. Id. The court of appeals engaged the Title VII burden-shifting analysis to
determine whether Barnett proved his ADA retaliation claim. Id. at 1121.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, a plaintiff
must show (1) that he or she engaged in or was engaging in an activity
protected by the ADA, (2) the employer subjected him or her to an
adverse employment decision, and (3) that there was a causal link
between the protected activity and the employer’s action.
Id. The court of appeals concluded that Barnett made his prima facie case, but
failed to raise a genuine issue of fact suggesting the U.S. Airways’ legitimate nonretaliatory explanation was mere pretext. Id.
169. Id. at 1120 (emphasis added).
170. Id.
171. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1520 (2002).
U.S. Airways petitioned for certiorari, asking us to decide whether “the
[ADA] requires an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a
position as a ‘reasonable accommodation’ even though another
employee is entitled to hold the position under the employer’s bona
fide and established seniority system.” The Circuits have reached
different conclusions about the legal significance of a seniority system.
We agreed to answer U.S. Airways’ question.
Id. (citations omitted).
172. As noted, the court of appeals also reviewed Barnett’s claim for failure to
engage in the interactive process, as well as his retaliation claim. See Barnett, 228
F.3d at 1108. However, these issues are outside the scope of this case note. This
note will address only Barnett’s claim that U.S. Airways violated the ADA by not
allowing him to remain in his mailroom position as a reasonable accommodation
and as an exception to its seniority policy.
173. Id. at 1117.
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174

accommodation may include reassignment.
Next, the court
reviewed EEOC enforcement guidelines, other circuits’ holdings,
175
and the legislative history of the ADA.
First, the court noted that no other circuit has answered the
176
question of whether a seniority system trumps reassignment.
However, it found that the legislative history of the ADA indicates
that a collective bargaining agreement is only a factor in determining
the reasonableness of an accommodation, but rejects any per se
177
bar. In addition, the court found the EEOC guidelines reject any
blanket rule that would consider a collective bargaining agreement
178
a per se bar to a reasonable accommodation. Given the lack of
bargained rights in the present case as compared to a collective
bargaining agreement, the court asserted that a “seniority system
179
without more should not bar reassignment.” Furthermore, the
court found that a per se bar conflicts with the basic premise of the
180
ADA and frustrates the statute’s goals. A per se bar would sharply
limit the range of available accommodations, as well as limit the
ADA’s effort to ground accommodation in the individualized needs
181
of the disabled.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that a
seniority system is not a per se bar to reassignment, but rather is a
182
factor in the undue hardship analysis.
Second, the court of appeals found agency interpretation
174. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000)).
175. Id. at 1117-20.
176. Id. at 1118.
177. Id. at 1119.
[I]f a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for
employees with a given amount of seniority, it may be considered as a
factor in determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation to
assign an employee with a disability without seniority to the job.
However, the agreement would not be determinative on the issue.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 34546.
178. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1119. “In the EEOC’s view, such a per se rule nullifies
Congress’ intent that undue hardship always be determined on a case-by-case
basis.” Id. (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue
Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH), § 902,
No. 915.002, at 5463 (March 1, 1999)). The EEOC states that the employer and
union should negotiate in good faith a variance to the collective bargaining
agreement if no reasonable accommodation exists that avoids violating the
agreement. Id. (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, EEOC Compl. Man. at 5463).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1120.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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supported the contention that reassignment meant something
more than merely allowing a disabled person to compete equally
183
with non-disabled employees. The court relied heavily on EEOC
guidelines that advise an employer to provide reasonable
184
accommodations even though they are not available to others. In
response to U.S. Airways’ argument that the ADA guarantees no
more than an equal opportunity to apply and compete for
reassignment, the court pointed to the EEOC’s guidelines:
“Reassignment means that the employee gets the vacant position if
s/he is qualified for it. Otherwise, reassignment would be of little
185
value and would not be implemented as Congress intended.”
Moreover, the court looked to the EEOC’s reasoning that a
modification in workplace policy can be a reasonable
186
accommodation.
The court of appeals also pointed to other
187
circuits that had adopted the EEOC’s position.
Therefore, the court of appeals held that “[i]f there is no
undue hardship, a disabled employee who seeks reassignment as a
reasonable accommodation, if otherwise qualified for a position,
should receive the position rather than merely have an opportunity
188
to compete with non-disabled employees.”

183. Id. at 1117-18.
184. Id. at 1117 (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, EEOC Compl. Man. at
5454).
185. Id. at 1118 (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, EEOC Compl. Man. at
5456).
186. Id. at 1117-18.
187. Id. at 1118; see Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1165 (10th
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (finding that the ADA’s “reassignment obligation must mean
something more than merely allowing a disabled person to compete equally with
the rest of the world” and that reassignment is “one of the forms of reasonable
accommodation specifically mentioned by the statute to be utilized if necessary
and reasonable to keep an existing disabled employee employed by the
company.”); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (explaining that ADA’s reference to reassignment would be redundant if it
only gave permission to apply).
188. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1120. The dissent rejected the majority’s reasoning
that the ADA mandates employers to give preferences to disabled employees over
abled employees. See id. at 1126. The dissent cited the Seventh Circuit, which
stated that “[such a] . . . rule would convert a nondiscrimination statute into a
mandatory preference statute, a result which would be both inconsistent with the
nondiscriminatory aims of the ADA and an unreasonable imposition on the
employers and coworkers of disabled employees.” Id. (citing Dalton v. SubaruIsuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 679 (7th Cir. 1998)).
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C. The Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in a five to four
189
decision. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court and was joined by
190
Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, and Kennedy. Although
Justices O’Connor and Stevens concurred with the majority, they
191
both wrote separately. Finally, Justices Scalia and Souter filed two
divergent dissents, which were joined by Justices Thomas and
192
Ginsburg, respectively.
1. The Majority’s Opinion
The majority decided that a proposed accommodation that
would violate the rules of a seniority system is not “reasonable in
193
the run of cases.”
“To the contrary, it will ordinarily be
194
unreasonable for the assignment to prevail.”
To support its
189. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1518 (2002).
190. Id. at 1519-25.
191. Id. at 1525-28.
192. Id. at 1528-34.
193. Id. at 1524. In its findings, the Court rejected several of the arguments
put forth by U.S. Airways and Barnett. Id. at 1520-23. Specifically, U.S. Airways
argued that seniority systems should almost always trump a conflicting
accommodation demand when that accommodation requires that an employer
grant preferential treatment. Id. at 1520-21. The Court replied that the ADA
specifies that preferences will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the statute’s
goals. Id. at 1521. In fact, the ADA requires preferences in the form of
“reasonable accommodations.”
Id.
Accordingly, the Court rejected the
contention that the ADA creates an automatic exemption for neutral rules. Id.
U.S. Airways also pointed to the ADA’s provision that reassignment refers to a
“vacant” position. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000)). The Court
rejected U.S. Airways’ argument that a position is not “vacant” if an established
seniority system would assign that position to another worker. Id. The Court
perceptively pointed to U.S. Airways’ seniority system, which stated that Barnett’s
position became an “open” one. Id.
Barnett contemplated that the words “reasonable accommodation” meant only
“effective accommodation.” Id. at 1522. Since seniority systems have nothing to
do with effectiveness, Barnett argued that a seniority violation has nothing to do
with “reasonableness.” Id. Barnett added that a seniority rule violation might help
prove “undue hardship.” Id. However, he argued that a violation should not be
taken into consideration of determining “reasonable accommodation,” because
this would make the terms “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship”
mirror images and redundant. Id. The Court rejected each of these arguments,
by clarifying that the word “accommodation,” not the word “reasonable,” conveys
the need for effectiveness. Id. Furthermore, “reasonable accommodation” and
“undue hardship” are not mirror images, because the former refers its impact on
other employees, while the latter pertains to its impact on the operation of
business. Id.
194. Id. at 1524.
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contention, the Court looked to analogous case law in the context
195
of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act.
In such cases, the
employer was not required to make accommodations that would
196
conflict with the seniority rights of other employees.
Next, the Court listed several policy reasons that supported the
197
view that seniority systems should not be undermined.
First,
seniority systems provide important employee benefits by creating
198
and fulfilling employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment.
Second, employees receive the benefits of job security and an
opportunity for steady and predictable advancement based on
199
objective standards.
Third, seniority systems and collective
200
bargaining agreements limit unfairness in personnel decisions.
Fourth, the Court noted that seniority systems encourage employee
loyalty and investment in the company; an employee accepts less at
201
the beginning for a greater return in the long run. Finally, and
most importantly, the Court opined that a seniority system’s
consistent, uniform treatment would be undermined by a complex,
case-by-case analysis of each “accommodation” decision made by
202
management. Thus, the employer’s showing of a violation of the
rules of a seniority system is, by itself, ordinarily sufficient to show
203
that an accommodation is not reasonable.
The Court, however, articulated an exception to its implicit
blanket ruling. “The plaintiff (here the employee) nonetheless
remains free to show that special circumstances warrant a finding
that, despite the presence of a seniority system (which the ADA may

195. Id.
196. Id.; see Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79-80 (1977)
(holding that, in the context of a Title VII religious discrimination case, an
employer need not accommodate an employee’s worship schedule if it would
conflict with other employees’ seniority rights); Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790
(1st Cir. 1989) (concluding that under the Rehabilitation Act, “the postal service
was not required to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different
position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the
collective bargaining agreement.”); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.
1987) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act did not require an employer to reassign
an employee if the reassignment would defeat the provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement).
197. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1524-25.
198. Id. at 1524.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1524-25.
203. Id. at 1525.
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not trump in the run of cases), the requested ‘accommodation’ is
204
‘reasonable’ on the particular facts.”
For example, the Court
explained that an employer, who frequently and unilaterally
changes its seniority system, reduces employee expectations and
should accommodate an employee because “one more
205
departure . . . will not likely make a difference.”
Thus, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving special circumstances that make
206
an exception reasonable in the particular case.
In sum, “a showing that the assignment would violate the rules
of a seniority system warrants summary judgment for the employer
– unless there is more. The plaintiff must present evidence of that
‘more,’ namely, special circumstances surrounding the particular
207
case that demonstrate the assignment is nonetheless reasonable.”
Given the Court’s newly articulated rule, it vacated the Ninth
Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings
208
consistent with its opinion.
2. Justice Stevens’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote separately to comment on the court of
appeals’ analysis. First, Justice Stevens disagreed with the court of
appeals’ analysis that a seniority system is only relevant to the
question of whether a given accommodation would impose an
209
“undue hardship” on an employer. According to Justice Stevens,
a possible conflict with an employer’s seniority systems bears on
210
whether the requested accommodation is reasonable. Second,
Justice Stevens agreed with the court of appeals’ rejection of U.S.
Airways’ per se bar to reasonable accommodation which would
211
violate the rules of a seniority system.
204. Id.
205. Id. Alternatively, the plaintiff may show that the system already contains
so many exceptions, that one more will not matter. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1525-26.
210. Id. at 1525.
211. Id. at 1526. In addition, Justice Stevens presented several noteworthy
questions:
(1) [W]hether the mailroom position held by [Barnett] became open
for bidding merely in response to a routine airline schedule change, or
as the direct consequence of the layoff of several thousand employees;
(2) whether [Barnett’s] requested accommodation should be viewed as
an assignment to a vacant position, or as the maintenance of the status
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3. Justice O’Connor’s Concurring Opinion
Justice O’Connor clearly stated that she voted with the
212
majority in order that the Court could adopt a rule.
Justice
O’Connor found the Court’s test problematic and preferred a rule
in which determining whether an accommodation is reasonable is
dependent upon whether the seniority system prevents the position
213
in question from being vacant.
In a workplace with a legally
214
enforceable seniority system, a position will not become vacant if
215
the seniority system entitles another employee to that position.
Conclusively, “if a position is not vacant, then reassignment to it is
216
not a reasonable accommodation.” Even though troubled by the
Court’s reasoning, Justice O’Connor voted with the majority
because she felt that the Court’s approach would often lead to the
217
same outcome as her test.

quo; and
(3) exactly what impact the grant of [Barnett’s] request would have
had on other employees.
Id.
212. Id. “The Court, however, is divided in opinion, and if each member voted
consistently with his or her own beliefs, we would not agree on a resolution of the
question presented in this case.” Id. (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,
134 (1945)).
213. Id. at 1526-27.
214. Id. at 1527. “In a workplace with an unenforceable seniority policy,
however, an employee expecting assignment to a position under the seniority
policy would not have any type of contractual right to the position and so could
not be said to be its ‘possessor.’ The position therefore would become vacant.” Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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218

4. Justices Scalia and Thomas’s Dissenting Opinion

Justices Scalia and Thomas sharply criticized the Court for its
indecisive reasoning behind a ruling that, they say, leaves a disabled
employee in a state of uncertainty that can only be resolved by
219
constant litigation. To the contrary, Justices Scalia and Thomas
simply reasoned that employers must modify or remove policies
and practices that burden a disabled person because of his or her
220
disability.
Since a seniority system burdens the abled and
disabled alike, a seniority system is not a disability-related obstacle
and the ADA does mandate an exception to such a legitimate,
221
nondiscriminatory policy.
The Justices looked to several circuit courts, as well as the
222
EEOC, for support.
They suggest that the EEOC regulations

218. Justices Scalia and Thomas did not evaluate the reasonable
accommodation provision of the ADA. For this reason, this note excludes them
from the “reasonable accommodation” analysis. The Justices did conduct a
thorough analysis of whether seniority systems discriminate because of disability of
an individual. Id. at 1528-31; see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). They emphasized
that the ADA eliminates workplace barriers only if a disability prevents an
employee from overcoming them – those barriers that would not be barriers but for
the employee’s disability. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1529. They conclude that seniority
systems “bear no more heavily upon the disabled employee than upon others –
even though an exemption from such a rule or practice might in a sense ‘make up
for’ the employee’s disability.” Id. However, this reasoning glosses over the ADA’s
imposition of an affirmative obligation for employers to do just that – “make up
for” the employee’s disability. The ADA requires preferences in the form of
“reasonable accommodations” that are needed for those with disabilities to obtain
the same workplace opportunities that those without disabilities enjoy. This
includes adjustment to neutral office rules. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000)
(“[R]easonable accommodation may include . . . job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedule, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications to
examinations, training materials or policies, providing qualified readers or
interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.”).
219. See id. at 1528-32. “When one departs from this understanding, the ADA’s
accommodation provision becomes a standardless grab bag.” Id. at 1529. “The
employee would be entitled to an exception, for example, if he showed that ‘one
more departure’ from the seniority rules ‘will not likely make a difference.’ I have
no idea what this means.” Id. at 1531 (citations omitted).
220. Id. at 1529.
221. See id. at 1530.
222. See id. at 1530-31 (citing EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 353-55
(4th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028-29 (7th Cir.
2000); Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 257-58 (6th Cir. 2000);
Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas City, 214 F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th Cir.
2000); Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 1997);
Daugherty v. El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995)).
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acknowledge that the “ADA clears away only obstacles arising from a
223
person’s disability and nothing more.” Reassignment to a vacant
position does not include elimination of obstacles that have
224
nothing to do with a person’s disability. Indeed, this may lead to
225
the possibility of a preference for the disabled over the abled.
Accordingly, the Justices would rule that the ADA was not meant to
226
undercut bona fide seniority systems.
5. Justices Souter and Ginsburg’s Dissenting Opinion
In contrast to Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justices Souter and
Ginsburg approached the issue by first pointing out that “[n]othing
in the ADA insulates seniority rules from the ‘reasonable
227
accommodation’ requirement, in marked contrast to Title VII . . .
228
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
229
(ADEA).”
They pointed out that Congress modeled several of
the ADA’s provisions on Title VII, and Congress’s failure to
replicate Title VII’s exemption for seniority systems suggests that
230
seniority rules do not carry as much weight under the ADA.
Moreover, they point to legislative history explaining that seniority
provisions contained in a collective bargaining agreement are only
231
a factor when deciding whether an accommodation is reasonable.
Accordingly, “[b]ecause a unilaterally-imposed seniority system
enjoys no special protection under the ADA, a consideration of
facts peculiar to [the] . . . case is needed to gauge whether [the
plaintiff] has carried the burden of showing his proposed
223. Id. at 1531 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2001)).
224. Id. at 1530.
225. See id.
226. Id.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of
this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to [provide different benefits to employees] pursuant to a bona fide seniority . . .
system.”).
228. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(A) (2000) (“It shall not be unlawful for an
employer . . . to take any action otherwise prohibited [under previous sections] . . .
to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system [except for involuntary
retirement].”).
229. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1532.
230. Id. at 1533.
231. Id.; See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990) (collectively
bargained provisions for seniority are not determinative on the issue whether an
accommodation was reasonable); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 32 (1989) (a collectivebargaining agreement assigning jobs based on seniority may be a factor when
considering whether an accommodation is reasonable).
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accommodation to be a ‘reasonable’ one despite the [defendant’s
232
seniority] policy.”
Under Justices Souter and Ginsburg’s rule, Barnett proved that
his requested accommodation was reasonable, and the burden
should shift to U.S. Airways to show that a violation of the seniority
233
system would work an undue hardship. They found that Barnett
had held the mailroom job for two years before learning that U.S.
234
Airways declared the position vacant.
Thus, Barnett was not
235
seeking a change, but rather a continuation of status quo. Under
these circumstances, Barnett was not asking to bump other
236
employees and no one lost a job because of his accommodation.
Furthermore, U.S. Airways did not show evidence of any
237
unmanageable ripple effects. The company also took great pains
to ensure that its seniority rules raised no great expectations, that
the system was noncontractual, and that the system was modifiable
238
at U.S. Airways’ will. Accordingly, Justices Souter and Ginsburg
239
would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BARNETT DECISION
In Barnett, the Supreme Court created an untenable rule that
will increase confusion and litigation inside and outside the
courtroom, exacerbate the plight of disabled workers, and may
validate illegal, unilaterally imposed seniority schemes. Moreover,
the Court’s decision fails to take into account significant legislative
history, as well as the practical implications of its decision. While
the Court’s decision recognizes the historical and practical
importance of seniority systems in the American workforce, it
dismisses the practical discriminatory realities of seniority systems
and the ambitious goals of the ADA, enacted to overcome these
discriminatory effects.
240
There are four approaches taken in this split decision.
232. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1534.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Justice Stevens only comments on the Ninth Circuit’s approach. Id. at
1525-26. Justices Scalia and Thomas do not reach this analysis. Id. at 1528-32; see
also supra note 218.
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Three of these opinions begin with the same analysis but diverge in
their approach.
The opinions written by Justices Breyer,
241
O’Connor, and Souter begin with the two-part analysis found in
242
the ADA.
The ADA states that discrimination includes (1) an
employer’s not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitation of an otherwise qualified employee,
(2) unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its
243
business. Under this burden shifting analysis, the employee need
only show that an “accommodation” seems reasonable on its face,
and then the employer must show special circumstances that
244
demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances.
It is the first part of this burden-shifting analysis where the
three opinions diverge. According to Justice Breyer, writing for the
majority, an accommodation that conflicts with the rules of a
245
seniority system is ordinarily not reasonable. Justice O’Connor
would prefer to say that if a position were not vacant due to a legally
enforceable seniority system, reassignment would not be a
246
“reasonable” accommodation.
Finally, Justices Souter and
Ginsburg argue that a seniority system should not amount to more
than “a factor” when it comes to deciding “whether an
accommodation at odds with the seniority rules is ‘reasonable’
247
nevertheless.”
A. The Majority’s Perplexing Rule Stands on Shaky Grounds
The majority’s reasoning is unpersuasive, as it lacks a
foundation of legal precedent and is based on weak policy reasons.
248
The Court first finds precedent in cases based on Title VII and
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)(2000); 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (2003). See also
Alysa M. Barancik, Determining Reasonable Accommodations Under the ADA: Why Courts
Should Require Employers to Participate in an “Interactive Process,” 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
513, 527-29 (1999) (discussing Title VII’s McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting
analysis applied to ADA cases); Kevin W. Williams, Note, The Reasonable
Accommodation Difference: The Effect of Applying the Burden Shifting Frameworks
Developed under Title VII in Disparate Treatment Cases to Claims Brought under Title I of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 98, 98-102 (1997).
242. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1520, 1527-28, 1532-38.
243. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
244. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1523.
245. Id. at 1525.
246. Id. at 1527.
247. Id. at 1533.
248. Id. at 1524 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79-
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249

the Rehabilitation Act. It notes that in the context of a Title VII
religious discrimination case and several Rehabilitation Act cases,
seniority systems trump the need for reassignment as a reasonable
250
accommodation.
However, the Court fails to appreciate the
differences between the ADA and its predecessors.
The Court’s reliance on the Rehabilitation Act is unpersuasive
because the Rehabilitation Act does not even list “reassignment” as
251
a reasonable accommodation. More problematic, though, is the
252
Court’s reliance on Title VII. Title VII’s definition and analysis of
discrimination is incompatible with the ADA. The two statutes have
similar goals, but their means of achieving these goals are distinct
and incongruent. Title VII promotes equality based on immutable
traits that do not directly impact a person’s ability to perform
253
certain jobs.
Conversely, a disability is sometimes a legitimate
254
consideration in employment decisions.
Because of these
differences, the ADA mandates an affirmative obligation on
employers to make individualized reasonable accommodations,
whereas Title VII proscribes employers from considering a person’s
255
race, gender, religion, or national origin. Consequently, Title VII
is also unpersuasive precedent in evaluating the reasonable
80 (1977) (Title VII religious discrimination case)). However, the committee
reports of both Houses were aware of Hardison and expressed a choice against
treating it as authority under the ADA, with its lack of provisions for exempting
seniority systems. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350 (“The committee wishes to make it clear that the principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison . . . are not applicable to this
legislation”); see also S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 36 (1989) (expressing same opinion).
249. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir. 1989) (Rehabilitation Act case).
250. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1524.
251. See 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(4) (2000), which provides that:
Congress finds that . . . increased employment of individuals with
disabilities can be achieved through implementation of statewide
workforce investment systems under title I of the Workforce
Investment Act of 1998 [29 U.S.C.A. § 2801 et seq.] that provide
meaningful and effective participation for individuals with disabilities
in workforce investment activities and activities carried out under the
vocational rehabilitation program established under subchapter I of
this chapter, and through the provision of independent living services,
support services, and meaningful opportunities for employment in
integrated work settings through the provision of reasonable
accommodations.
Id.
252. See Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1524.
253. See Malloy, supra note 6, at 608.
254. See id.
255. See id. at 622.
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accommodation provision.
Next, the Court reviews the history of seniority systems in the
256
United States.
Although the Court makes a valid point that
seniority systems have advantages for both employers and
employees, it ignores the ultimate purpose of the ADA – placing an
“affirmative . . . [obligation on employers] to promote entry of
257
disabled into the workforce.” Ironically, the Court quoted this
258
sentence earlier when discussing the “statute’s primary purpose.”
Yet, the Court dismisses its own reasoning to give undeserved
weight and importance to mere customary seniority systems.
Moreover, it overlooks Congress’s decision not to give an
exemption to seniority systems as it had done in prior anti259
discrimination legislation.
Finally, the Court articulates a perplexing rule that invites
constant litigation, provides little guidance for litigants and judges,
and places a disproportionate burden on plaintiffs.
“The
plaintiff . . . nonetheless remains free to show that special
circumstances warrant a finding that, despite the presence of a
seniority system (which the ADA may not trump in the run of
cases), the requested ‘accommodation’ is ‘reasonable’ on the
260
particular facts.”
As Justice Scalia rightly pondered, “I have no
261
idea what this means.”
The Court vaguely explains that an
employer who frequently changes its rules under a seniority system
reduces employee expectations and, therefore, should
accommodate the employee because one more departure will not
262
matter.
This leaves district courts and litigants with little
guidance to determine a threshold at which the number of
exceptions becomes too many. On the other hand, employers
need only halt making any exceptions to their unilaterally imposed
seniority systems to avoid a lawsuit, even if their seniority systems
256. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1524-25.
257. Id. at 1523.
258. Id. at 1522-23.
259. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2000) (“It
shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization . . . to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority systems that is not
intended to evade the purposes of this chapter.”); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(2000) (“[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system . . . .”).
260. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1525.
261. Id. at 1531.
262. Id. at 1525.
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discriminate.
Another disconcerting issue is whether the Court’s ruling
places the entire burden of proof on the employee. Under the
Court’s test, the employer only needs to show the presence of a
seniority system, whereas the plaintiff must prove that an
accommodation is reasonable despite the presence of a seniority
system. In doing so, the employee ultimately also bears the burden
of showing that its employer’s seniority system is inconsistently
263
followed, illegitimate, or merely a sham.
This rule is not only
confusing, but also unduly and improperly burdensome on
264
employees.
In addition to the Court’s distressing departure from
precedent, logic, and fairness, the Court fails to address the
265
legislative history of the ADA. Instead of looking to the intent of
Congress, the Court bases its decision on a custom that has no legal
standing in common law or statutory law. The Court does
acknowledge that preferences will sometimes prove necessary to
266
achieve the ADA’s goals, but it stops there. Here, the remainder
of the Court steps in to voice valid concerns.
B. Justice O’Connor’s Concern About Reassignment and Vacancy
In looking at the ADA’s legislative history, Justice O’Connor
points out that Congress did not intend for reassignment to bump
267
other employees out of a position to create a vacancy.
Accordingly, she reasons that reassignment to a position cannot be
268
reasonable unless the position is truly vacant.
In determining
whether a position is vacant, the threshold is determining whether
269
a seniority system is legally enforceable. If a legally enforceable
seniority system is in place, an open position may not actually be
vacant because another employee may have a legal entitlement to
the position. While this reasoning properly acknowledges the true
263. See id. at 1532.
264. The ADA burden-shifting analysis: once the plaintiff shows that an
accommodation seems reasonable on its face, the defendant must show special
circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the context of the particular
employer’s operations. Id. at 1527-28.
265. See id. at 1523-25.
266. Id. at 1521.
267. Id. at 1527 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345; S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 32 (1989)).
268. Id. at 1527.
269. See id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss4/3

34

Pirius: "Seniority Rules"?: Disabled Employees' Rights under the ADA Give
PIRIUS_F ORMATTED_1

2003]

3/27/2003 11:58 PM

U.S. AIRWAYS, INC. V. BARNETT

1515

(non)legal standing of most seniority systems, it fails to take into
account Congress’s failure to exempt seniority systems and the
legislative history, which notes that seniority systems are only a
270
“factor” in deciding whether an accommodation is reasonable.
C. Justices Souter and Ginsberg’s Reasoning Finds Basis in the ADA
Justices Souter and Ginsburg’s reasoning most accurately
reflects the goals, legislative history, and plain language of the
ADA. They correctly note that “[a]lthough [we] concur in the
Court’s appreciation of the value and importance of seniority
systems, [we] do not believe that [our] hand[s] [are] free to accept
271
the majority’s result . . . . “ A custom should not give way to antidiscrimination legislation.
The Justices correctly point out that “[n]othing in the ADA
insulates seniority rules from the ‘reasonable accommodation’
requirement, in marked contrast to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
272
each of which has an explicit protection for seniority.”
This
dissimilarity is bolstered by committee reports, which explicitly
state that seniority protections in collectively bargained agreements
should not amount to more than a “factor” in deciding whether an
273
accommodation is reasonable. Justices Souter and Ginsberg also
note that Congress considered that a legally recognized collective
274
bargaining agreement is no more than a factor in the analysis.
Accordingly, a non-contractual and unilaterally imposed seniority
system imposed by the employer should not be singled out for
275
protection under the ADA. Seniority systems do not deserve the
generous protection given by the majority.
In addition, the Justices ruled out the majority’s reliance of
276
Title VII precedent.
“The committees of both Houses of
Congress dealing with the ADA were aware of [Trans World Airlines
277
v. Hardison]
and expressed a choice against treating it as
authority under the ADA, with its lack of any provision for
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

See id. at 1532-33.
Id. at 1532.
Id. at 1532-33.
Id. at 1533.
Id. at 1533-34.
See id.
Id. at 1533.
432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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278

maintaining seniority rules.”
Given the overall purpose of the ADA and its legislative history,
Justice Souter and Ginsburg present the strongest argument of the
Court. They argue that consideration of facts peculiar to an
individual’s case is needed to gauge whether the employee has
carried the burden of showing his proposed accommodation to be
279
reasonable despite the presence of a seniority system.
In
reviewing Barnett’s case, the Justices took into account that Barnett
was seeking merely to maintain his status quo, not to bump another
280
employee from a job. In addition, they noted that U.S. Airways’
seniority system should not carry much weight given that the system
281
was non-contractual and unilaterally imposed. Conclusively, they
282
would have held that Barnett met his burden.
This test gives credence to the legislative history and plain
language of the ADA. In addition, it recognizes the dissimilarities
between Title VII and the ADA. Finally, this analysis takes into
account Justice O’Connor’s valid concern of whether the seniority
system is legally enforceable. Unfortunately, their test places a
burden on the employee to show evidence that the employer’s
seniority system may be a scam or legally unenforceable. On the
other hand, there is no presumption against the employee, and the
employer still faces the burden of showing that a violation of the
seniority scheme would work an undue hardship. Overall, this test
is most compatible with the ADA.
V. CONCLUSION
In its attempts to protect seniority systems, the Supreme Court
has virtually eviscerated the goals of Congress’s anti-discrimination
legislation. The Court’s decision in Barnett exacerbates the
contraction of remedies available to a class of plaintiffs, whom
Congress meant to empower. In enacting Title VII and the ADA,
Congress sought, in part, to redress historical discrimination in the
283
workplace. Yet, the Supreme Court perpetuates discrimination
by allowing non-legally binding seniority systems to trump Title VII,
278. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350).
279. See id. at 1534.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a); 2000e-4(h)(2) (2000).
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the Rehabilitation Act, and just recently, the ADA.
In enacting the ADA, Congress took a different and more
aggressive approach than in previous anti-discrimination
legislation. Because disabilities directly affect work performance,
285
Congress needed affirmative action to eradicate barriers.
To
help advance that goal, Congress made it unlawful for an employer
to fail to provide reasonable accommodations for a known
286
In addition, Congress did not provide an express
disability.
exemption for seniority systems, and discussed that seniority
systems should only be a non-dispositive factor in determining
287
whether an accommodation is reasonable.
Nevertheless, the
Barnett Court carved out a presumption in favor of non-legally
288
binding seniority systems, even if they perpetuate discrimination.
The Barnett Court ignored the plain language of the ADA, its
legislative history, and its goal of advancing the disabled into the
289
workplace. Instead the Court gave unmerited weight to seniority
systems, leaving the disabled with little recourse against unilaterally
imposed seniority schemes.
From the start, the Court’s test places a heavy presumption
290
against plaintiffs, but little burden on the employer.
The
291
employer merely must show a violation of a seniority rule.
In
contrast, plaintiffs carry two heavy burdens: proving that (1) special
circumstances exist, under which, (2) their proposed
accommodation is reasonable – despite the presumption that a
violation of the rules of a seniority system is ordinarily sufficient to
292
show that an accommodation is not reasonable. This rule invites
constant litigation and gives little assurance to the disabled workers
who need the empowerment of the ADA. The Court’s ruling is one
more inequitable strike against plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases.

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

See discussion supra Parts II.B-C.
See Malloy, supra note 6, at 608.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
See discussion supra Part II.C.
122 S. Ct. at 1525.
See discussion supra Parts III.C.1, IV.
See discussion supra Part IV.
Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1525.
Id.
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